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The rise of the digital economy is causing a surge in Intellectual Property (IP) licensing as more 
and more IP assets are being incorporated into products and product service systems (PSS). 
Today’s IP licensing models possess rigid structures that put incumbent licensing parties at an 
advantage and imply large barriers to entry for innovative enterprises. This paper contrasts the 
traditional, predominantly lump-sum licensing models with fairer and more flexible models 
that could be enabled by automated licensing management systems. Thereby, we take a first 
step towards leveraging the potential of flexible IP licensing models to reduce the complexities, 
inefficiencies and trust issues inherent in IP licensing today. We discuss three different fixed 
and usage-based IP licensing models that we plan to test in a successive simulation study to 
more closely explore the economic implications of fixed versus usage-based IP licensing for 
the involved stakeholders. 
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Introduction 
In light of the growing number of Intellectual Property (IP) assets incorporated by single 
devices1,2 and the rise of IP in- and out-licensing3, the management and payment of IP licenses 
is becoming increasingly complex and mission-critical for both licensors (IP owners) and 
licensees (e.g. OEMs), not only for IoT technologies. Due to the complexity inherent in IP 
licensing agreements, ensuring contract compliance is close to impossible4. On top of that, 
thanks to the power of incumbent licensees, licensors often reap only part of the value that 
should be attributed to them. On the other end, the common lump sum or percentage of sales 
royalties are often passed downstream to the final customer by being added to a product’s 
purchase price. As a result of these hefty upfront costs in product development and 
commercialisation, new industries (e.g. Internet of Things (IoT)5, smart mobility, 
communications technology and consumer electronics) are preventing innovations as new 
companies face large barriers to market entry. 
As a first step towards improving licensor value attribution and reducing the barrier to 
market entry in upcoming industries, this paper proposes fairer and more flexible pricing 
schemes for IP licensing. In these schemes, lump sum payments are substituted or 
complemented by usage-based components that comprise arbitrarily complex variables and 
rules. Usage-based licensing refers to the practice of charging based on some measure that is 
related to the usage of the concerned IP. Every time that the IP is used, its usage (count or 
duration) increases marginally. The size of the payment is determined by a supporting system 
that tracks the usage metric and sends the information on a certain schedule for the royalty 
payment to be executed. In order to ensure compliance with these yet more complex terms, we 
propose that IP licensing contracts should be automatically tracked and executed as smart 
contracts (SC) in a DLT-based Automated Licensing Payment System (ALPS) (Tietze & 
Granstrand, 2019). 
 
1 A modern smartphone is expected to incorporate more than 250,000 active patents, RPX Corp., Registration 
Statement (Form S-1), 59 (Sept. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/0001193125-11-240287-index.htm 
(last accessed Aug. 18, 2020). 
2 over 75 billion IoT devices to be projected by 2025, available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/471264/iot-
number-of-connected-devices-worldwide (last accessed Aug. 18, 2020) 
3https://www.aranca.com/knowledge-library/blogs-and-opinions/ip-research/ip-licensing-strategy-to-ensure-
growth-in-adversities-3 
4 Ensuring licensing contract compliance comes potentially with substantial transaction costs due to the 
potential complexity of the data collection task (Tietze & Granstrand, 2019, p. 351) 
5 IoT refers to multi-technology devices that can transfer data and make decisions autonomously based on the 
shared information. (Atzori et al., 2010) (last accessed Oct. 15, 2020). 
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We put forward three different IP licensing models comprising fixed and usage-based 
components to take a first step towards understanding and thus leveraging the potential of 
nonlinear IP licensing models. These models are to be tested and evaluated in a consecutive 
study. Beyond the world of connected devices and the IoT, this licensing model may even find 
its way into various other industries such as big data and open source software licensing (Tietze, 
2020). 
 
The Digital Economy 
With the boom of globalisation and technology trade across industries in the 1980s, the practice 
of IP licensing gained increased global economic importance. The resulting surge in patent 
applications and the strategic importance of patents facilitated the emergence of today’s ‘pro-
licensing era’ (Ove Granstrand, 2004). The digital economy (Krishnan & Chakravarti, 1997; 
Tapscott, 1996; Teece, 2012), open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) and more recently, the IoT 
have contributed to this development (Atzori et al., 2010; Gubbi et al., 2013). In line with this 
trend, devices incorporate increasingly complex sets of technologies (e.g. software, sensors, 
data transmission and encryption technologies (Tietze & Granstrand, 2019). Since hardly any 
company is able to develop the required technology entirely in-house, finished products often 
include IP assets that are owned, operated and maintained by different companies (e.g. 
bluetooth patents, 4G patents or software IP for computational processes (O. Granstrand & 
Oskarsson, 1994; Tietze & Fletcher, n.d.; Tietze & Granstrand, 2019). As a result, the licensing 
interdependencies between licensees and licensors are gaining in volume and complexity along 
both the supply and value chain of digitally connected products and services. 
 
Despite this development, the payment of IP licenses is often still processed semi-manually 
inducing substantial room for error, uncertainties and trust problems between licensees and 
licensors (Burns & Sandelin, 1998; Kiernan, 1998; Tietze & Granstrand, 2019).6 On the one 
hand, licensees are particularly burdened with the task of managing multiple agreements for 
each of their manufactured products, by tracking and computing the correct amount to be paid 
as well as executing the payments to the respective licensors. On the other hand, licensors have 
 
6 These problems may, for example, be caused by information asymmetries between the involved parties. 
Commonly, IP licensing fees are computed based on a product’s sales figures. For large corporations 
determining exact sales figures semi-manually is both highly resource intensive and close to impossible. 
Similarly, commissioning external auditors to investigate incorrect payments is extremely expensive for 
licensors (Tietze & Granstrand, 2019). 
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to trust the correctness of the royalties received from licensees or commission costly audits. 
Burns & Sandelin (1998) reported a well-known example involving Stanford University as a 
licensor that indicates the scale of the inherent trust problem. According to the authors, Stanford 
University received payments of $247,000 from its licensees shortly after announcing that the 
university was about to commission an external licensing audit. 
 
Today’s IP Licensing 
IP licenses come in various forms and structures. At its foundation, every licensing agreement 
consists of contractual parties, the agreement’s duration (or expiration date) and its payment 
logic. The payment logic can encompass any given number of parameters and conditions, such 
as  a non-recurring lump-sum payment and/or a recurring royalty payment. Lump sum payments 
specify a particular amount payable in a given reference currency on a particular date. 
Recurring royalties (‘R’) are variable payments consisting of a royalty rate ‘r’ that is multiplied 
by a royalty base ‘b’ (Ove Granstrand, 2010; WIPO & ITC, 2010). 
(i) R = r x b 
In today’s linear IP licensing agreements, even though in theory all kind of royalty bases 
could be agreeable in contractual agreements, royalties mostly either do not exist or have 
simplistic royalty bases such as the revenue or gross profit of an IP-carrying device, which, as 
such, can appear quite difficult to determine, for instance in large multinational corporate 
settings. Royalty rates, in turn, are often fixed percentages. In theory, however, royalty bases 
may encompass any kind of quantifiable measure and form complex sets of rules together with 
the corresponding royalty rates. Besides, royalties may depend on further variables such as 
global maxima or minima, a due date and the frequency of recurrence (Ove Granstrand, 2010; 
WIPO & ITC, 2010). Exploiting this flexibility would allow for IP licensing agreements to be 
tailored more closely to the needs of individual licensees and licensors. The following example 
serves to illustrate a more customised and tailored IP licensing agreement: 
 
(i) for an IP component in an IoT device, a licensee pays 0.1 USD for each time the IP 
is used to the licensor, but pays 0.2 USD for each usage if the IP is EPC (European 
Patent Convention) or PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) approved, and pays an 
additional 0.05 USD for each usage if the manufacturer reaches more than 2m USD in 
capital. The total payment, however, is capped at 2000 USD. 
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The variables and parameters used in licensing agreements can be of arbitrary nature and 
may include exchange rates, a federal interest rate or other event-based characteristics. Thanks 
to this modular structure of parameters and rules and under the condition that it is possible to 
precisely track these parameters to correctly compute IP licensing payments, nonlinear IP 
licensing is possible. 
 
Nonlinear IP Licensing 
To reduce the inefficiencies inherent in today’s suboptimal, predominantly lump-sum licensing 
models, we study and seek to apply nonlinear pricing of information goods to more closely 
tailor IP licensing payments to consumers’ usage behaviours. In information-intensive markets, 
traditional selling strategies are gradually being complemented or substituted by recurring 
payment strategies (Lehmann & Buxmann, 2009). While traditional selling entitles customers 
with the perpetual right of use over a product or service, recurring payment strategies such as 
the royalty payments introduced before link payments, and possibly ownership, to a certain 
base measure such as time or performance. 
Recurring payment models began to be commercially applied on a larger scale with the 
so-called servitization, i.e. the shifting focus that manufacturing companies were putting on the 
provision of services  (Essig, Glas, Selviaridis & Roehrich; Lütjen, Schultz, Tietze & Urmetzer, 
2019). Various kinds of recurring payment models have been designed as a result of this trend. 
Among the most prominent examples are the ‘Power-by-the-Hour’7 model introduced by Rolls-
Royce Aerospace in 1962, Pay-per-Use and Subscription models (e.g. for carsharing services 
(Tietze, Schiederig & Herstatt, 2013)) as well as more recently the Software-as-a-Service 
scheme (Bala & Carr, 2010). In essence, these models aim to align the interest of the user or 
operator with the interest of the manufacturer by paying for products only if they continue to 
perform well8. 
 
A wide set of literature has emerged studying the pricing of information goods such as 
computer software under varying pricing regimes, multiple states of competition (i.e. 
monopoly, oligopoly, perfect competition) and taking into account a range of influencing 
factors (e.g. customers’ utility-per-use, customers’ usage frequency, transaction costs of 
 
7 Available at https://www.rolls-royce.com/media/press-releases-archive/yr-2012/121030-the-hour.aspx (last 
accessed Oct 15, 2020) 
8 Ibid. 
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monitoring usage) (Balasubramanian, Bhattacharya & Krishnan, 2015; Bala & Carr, 2010; Jia, 
Liao & Feng, 2018; Jiang,  Chen & Mukhopadhyay, 2001; Sundararajan, 2004). Several key 
factors can be drawn from this research to study the conditions under which nonlinear IP 
licensing might be superior or inferior to other licensing schemes. 
 
Firstly, the transaction cost of payment processing (TCpp) influences the desirability of 
licensing models and is hence part of our analysis. The TCpp mainly comprise costs to calculate 
and settle IP license payments. On top of that, it might include the cost of information 
asymmetry and lack of trust between licensing parties in case of error-prone payment 
processing as well as the costs of resolving disputes between those parties (Balasubramanian 
et al., 2015). 
Secondly, the transaction cost of administering usage (TCau) is a key factor and contains 
expenses to track and monitor usage (Balasubramanian et al., 2015; Varian, 2003; Cheng, 
Demirkan & Koehler, 2003). These costs are particularly relevant in information-intensive 
markets where the variable costs of digital (re-)production is close to zero. Thanks to 
advancements in digital technologies and automation, these costs have been reduced in recent 
decades. However, they persist and inhibit the profitability of pay-per-use models. The 
significance of the TCau depends on the size of the resulting additional IP licensing fee. With a 
system that tracks and executes IP licenses, the TCau would mostly consist of a one-off payment 
for installation at each participating entity. Thus, depending on the distribution of TCau per 
entity and the number of IP licensing payments per entity, the resulting size of the added fee 
per IP licensing payment may be fairly low. 
Thirdly, customer heterogeneity needs to be considered as it takes into account how 
customers vary in both usage (i.e. usage frequency) and in the perceived value (i.e. utility-per-
use) of a given product (Balasubramanian et al., 2015). Scholars have found that customers 
with low usage patterns typically prefer pay-per-use systems (Balasubramanian et al., 2015). 
Concerning value perception, customers tend to undervalue the utility gained from products in 
the pay-per-use model due to the ticking meter effect (Balasubramanian et al., 2015). This 
psychological effect dampens the value of consuming a product because new payments recur 
continuously throughout its consumption. But below a certain usage threshold, the TCau 
incurred (when split per usage) exceeds the value that customers gain per usage (Bala & Carr, 
2010). This might be solvable with thresholds that distinguish linear from nonlinear pricing 
rules i.e. hybrid payment models.  
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Fourthly, the number of IP licenses owned by companies in a certain industry (i.e. licensed 
IPs per company) and the number of companies in an industry (i.e. company per industry) 
might impact the desirability of one or the other licensing model in different industries. Hence, 
these factors are to be taken into account in the model comparison in order to allow for 
differences across industries. Using these sets of criteria, we create three scenarios to test the 
conditions under which non-linear pricing might be superior to both licensees and licensors. 
 
Three licensing model scenarios 
Taking a first step towards evaluating the potential of nonlinear IP licensing models to reduce 
the inefficiencies inherent in today’s IP licensing payment processes, this section discusses 
how different types of transaction costs affect IP licensing models under varying market 
conditions. To do so, we define the following three models: a (i) fixed percentage of sales 
model (base case scenario), a (ii) pay-per-use model and (iii) a hybrid model containing fixed 
and usage-based elements. 
 
(i) The first model represents today’s predominant IP licensing models and calculates 
royalty fees as ‘25% of gross profit’ achieved from the sale of the licensed IP. In this model, 
the TCpp is substantially large yet dependent on how error-prone the payment handling process 
is. The TCau is zero as usage is not factored into the licensing fees. The usage frequency may 
differ across licensees but the usage frequency at which this model’s utility exceeds the others 
is possibly fairly high because the TCpp inhibits the utility of this model at a low usage 
frequency. 
 
(ii) The second model is based on a degressive usage-based logic: the licensee pays X USD 
for each unit sold to the licensor, but pays X*0.8 USD for each unit sold if the total usage count 
reaches Y. This scheme requires recurring payments to be calculated and executed securely and 
correctly which comes with significant TCau. But assuming substantial security and accuracy 
of the payment system, the TCpp would be close to zero. This model grants potential benefits 
to licensees who cannot afford high upfront costs, and also to licensors whose customers have 
a low usage profile. However, due to the ticking meter effect, it might deter customers with 
high usage profiles who have solid finances to pay lump sum costs. 
 
 
            8 
(iii) The hybrid model combines a fixed element and usage-based pricing as follows: the 
licensee pays X USD for each unit sold to the licensor, but pays X*0.8 USD for each unit sold 
if the total usage count reaches Y. If the total usage count is below Y after k years from the date 
of contract ratification, the licensee pays an additional lump sum fee of Z USD. Hybrid models 
may take multiple forms of arbitrary complexity to specifically reflect the needs and intentions 
of the contractual parties. This specific example is used because it prevents the fundamental 
problem that pay-per-use models have with low usage frequencies. Similarly to model (ii), this 
model would have a TCpp that is close to zero and a TCau that is fairly large. The more complex 
the contract conditions and the more dependent they are on external information (e.g. usage 
counts, dates, exchange rates), the more error-prone and hence costly a licensing model might 
be. This trade-off needs to be accounted for when designing hybrid IP licensing models. 
Nevertheless, Sundararajan (2004) pointed out that under certain market conditions and with a 
TCau higher than zero, hybrid pricing models are optimal in information goods markets. 
 
Conclusions, Future Research and Economic Implications 
This paper contrasts traditional linear licensing models with non-linear models that could be 
enabled by automated licensing management systems, such as the ALPS technology. We 
discuss three different fixed and usage-based IP licensing models to take a first step towards 
understanding and thus leveraging the potential of nonlinear IP licensing models to reduce 
complexities, inefficiencies and trust issues inherent in upcoming IP-heavy industries. In 
succession to this piece we plan to test the three licensing models in a simulation study to more 
closely explore the economic implications of fixed versus usage-based IP licensing for the 
involved stakeholders. 
Despite its potential benefits, usage-based IP licensing might also come with substantial 
challenges that we seek to contextualise with the help of the successive analyses. Exemplary 
challenges include estimating the price range at which a secure ALPS might be economically 
feasible and evaluating technical properties of DLT-based ALPS including synonymous 
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